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NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT. 3
PENNSYLVANIA, SUPREME COURT. 4
AGENT.
Knowledge of Agent notice to Principal.--If a purchaser's agent
buys goods on behalf of his principal, from a factor, knowing, no mat-
ter by what means, that the goods are not the goods of the factor, the
knowledge of the agent must be held to be the knowledge of the prin-
cipal: Dresser vs. Norwood, Exch. Ch., 10 Jur. N. S. 851.
Government Board.-On question as to the authority of agents and
their power to bind their principals, the same rules of law and equity
apply, whether they act as the agent of a private individual or a private
or a public company, or of a government board; and persons dealing
with them are not only bound by the same obligations, but are entitled
to the same rights and to rely on the same principles: Thorn vs. Com-
missioners of Public Forks, 32 Beav. 490.
AGREEMENT.
Bill of Sale-What passes by.-M. & R. being copartners in busi-
ness, R., by an agreement in-writing, sold and conveyed to W. all his
interest in "the property and effects" of the firm, being one-half, "that
is to say, the undivided one-half of all the said goods, working tools,
notes and bills receivable, and all other valuable thing or things belong-
ing to said firm, of every name and kind;" subject, however, to the
payment by W. of one-half of all the debts and liabilities of the firm,
due and to become due, which he agreed to pay. It was contemplated
at the time, that W. should take the place of M. in the firm, which he
subsequently did. Held, that under the general terms of this agree-
ment, R.'s interest in a sum of money deposited in bank to the credit
of the firm of R. & M., passed to W., although the existence of such
deposit was unknown to the parties at the time of the sale: Cram vs.
The Union Bank of Rochester, 42 Barb.
And this, although an inventory of the property was taken, which the
parties supposed embraced every article belonging to the firm; the con-
tract not being, in terms, limited by the inventory, which was not men-
' From "Notanda," by Tenison Edwards, Esq., for November, 1864, contain-
ing recent decisions of all the courts, as indicated by the letters following each
case.
2From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in VoL 8 of his Reports.
3From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in Vol. 42 of his Reports.
AFrom R. E. Wright, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 11 of his Reports.
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tioned or referred to in the bill of sale; the parties having employed
words of description so general and comprehensive as to include every
species and article of property of the firm, whether enumerated in the
inventory or not: Id.
Suits to reform Written Agreements.-It is an invariable rule of courts
of equity that in an action to reform a written agreement, on account of
an alleged mistake of facts, relief will not be granted except upon the
clearest and most satisfactory proof of the mistake, and of the real agree-
ment between the parties: Botsford vs. McLean, 42 Barb.
A chattel-mortgage, given as collateral security for the payment of
promissory notes, cannot properly be considered as evidence of an agree-
ment to pay interest on the notes, except according to their terms: Id.
In the absence of any evidence or finding of fraud on the part of the
defendant, or of a mutual mistake, no case is made for reforming a writ-
ten contract: Id.
BAILMENT.
Liability of Gratuitous Bailee.-A., the owner of a shed, allowed B.
to use it for the purpose of working up some timber. C., a carpenter
employed by B. for the purpose, while employed on the work set fire to
the shed while lighting his pipe. Held, that the law as to gratuitous
bailment of a chattel did not apply, and that B. was not liable for the
damage. The negligence of 0. was not relative to his employment:
Woodman vs. Joiner, Exch., 10 Jur. N. S. 852.
BILLs AND NoTEs.
Notice of Dishonor-Delay.-Where the holder of a check transmits
it through the post to the drawees, and the cash for it is not remitted by
return of post, that should be considered as a dishonor, and notice of it
should at once be given to the drawer. In the present case, the drawees
having continued to pay over the counter for three days after the trans-
mission of the check: -eld, that notice of the dishonor not having been
promptly given, the drawer was exonerated: Bailey vs. Bodenham, 16
C. B. N. S. 288.
Presentment through Post.-Quere, whether transmission of a check
to the drawers through the post is a good presentment. Evidence of
usage may make it a good, presentment: Id.
Notice to Surety-Married Woman.-A surety upon a note is not dis-
charged by notice to the holder to sue the principal debtor, unless the
notice and the evidence of it are so clear and distinct that the meaning
of the surety can be at once apprehended without explanation or argu-
ment: Shimer et al. vs. Jones et al., 11 Wright.
A married woman is entitled to notice on account of her separate
estate as any other person would be, either from the party interested to
give notice or some one authorized by him: notice to the'husband alone
without more is not notice to the wife; though if intended for the wife
and delivered to the husband for her, it is then a question of service
merely : Id.
Where the proof of notice relied on to discharge a surety from a note
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held by a married woman was the admission of the husband made after
the alleged notice, that the surety had called upon him and told him to
bring suit upon the note immediately or he would be no longer responsi-
ble as surety, it was insufficient; so also were the admissions of the wife
that her husband had informed her of his conversation with the surety
as to what he wanted him to do with the note, not communicated to her
as a warning or notice from the surety, nor by the husband as his con-
stituted agent: .1d.
It was therefore error to instruct the jury that if all the testimony on
the subject of notice was believed in point of law, the notice would be
sufficient to discharge the defendant; they should have been instructed
that it was insufficient: .d.
Upon the question as to the solvency of the principal debtor, the
attention of the jury must be restricted to the time when the notice was
given to sue out the note, and not to the time when it matured: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
JProcedure.-Semble, where an action is brought in one country, and
the rights are governed by a foreign law, which entitles the plaintiff to
recover, yet, as the remedy is governed by the lexfori, the plaintiff will
be defeated if by that law there is an impediment to his procedure; as
in the present case, an unregistered medical attendant suing for medical
attendance, &c.: De La Rosa vs. Prieto, 16 C. B. N. S. 578.
CONTRACT.
Evidence.-nWhere there is a written contract with respect to the
price to be paid for a particular thing, but such thing has not been defi-
nitely or adequately described, extrinsic evidence will be admitted to
show what was intended; as where there was a contract that for a cer-
tain sum the defendants should be at liberty to obtain from plaintiff's
quarry all the stone, of whatever description, they may require in the
enlargement of the old compensation reservoir. Held, evidence might
be received to show what enlargement was in contemplation at the date
of the contract: Chadwick vs. Burnley Improvement Commissioners, Q
B., 12 W. R. 1877.
CORPORATION.
Treasurer's Bond-Sureties.-The sureties on the bond of the trea-
surer of a railroad company, the condition of which provides for his
faithful discharge of the duties of the office "during his continuance in
office, during the present year and for such further periods as he may
from time to time be elected to said office," are not liable for defaults
which occur after an omission to re-elect him at a regular meeting for
that purpose, and after such further time as may be reasonably sufficient
for the election and qualification of his successor, although he continues
to act as treasurer, and is re-elected at the next regular meeting there-
after; but they are not discharged from their liability by a vote of the
corporation postponing for five weeks the time of the regular meeting
for the election of officers, and the consequent postponement of an elec-
tion for that period, nor by the corporation's assuming the entire manage-
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ment of the railroad, after having leased it to another corporation: Lex-
ington and W. C. R. (o. vs. Elwell and others, 8 Allen.
No formal vote of a corporation 'accepting their treasurer's bond need
be shown, in order to entitle them to maintain an action upon it: Id.
A corporation is not estopped to maintain an action upon their trea-
surer's bond by having accepted a report of an auditing committee who
had approved his accounts, nor by making a report founded thereon to
the legislature: .d.
An indorsement by the treasurer of a corporation upon notes signed
by himself, and running to the corporation, is sufficient evidence to ren-
der the sureties upon his bond liable for the amount indorsed, as for
moneys received by him in his official capacity: Id.
COVENANT.
Licensee of .Mines.-A licensee of the working of minerals under cer-
tain lands, covenants with the grantor to make certain payments in
respect to any damage to the surface. Reld, this is a covenant that runs
with the land and binds an assignee of the license. Rieid, also, that
although the' license was to three, andh the covenant by the three jointly
and severally, yet the assignee of two was liable on the covenant: Wor-
val vs. Pascoe, V. C. Kindersley, 10 Jur. N. S. 792.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Attempt to Steal.-An attempt to commit felony can only in point of
law be made out where, if no interruption had taken place, the attempt
could have been carried out successfully. Therefore, where a person
puts his hand into the pocket of another, with intent to steal, but there
was nothing in the pocket which the prisoner could have stolen, a con-
viction for an attempt to commit larceny was quashed : Regina vs. Col-
lins, C. C. R., 33 L. J. N. S. Mag. Cas. 177.
DEED.
Bill in Equity to reform where no Fraud, Accident, or .Mistake is
alleged.-A grantor of land cannot maintain a bill in equity to reform
his.deed, by inserting therein a reservation which was included in the
oral agreement between the parties, if the omission to insert it does not
appear to have occurred through fraud, accident, or mistake, but in con-
sequence of his relying upon the promise of the grantee to carry out the
oral agreement. Nor, in such case, can relief be granted to the plain-
tiff on the ground that the defendant's refusal to perform his promise is
fraudulent: Andrew vs. Spurr, 8 Allen.
Reservation of Wood, &c.-If the grantor in a deed d6scribes the
granted premises in general terms, and reserves the wood and timber
"C on said premises, south of the meadow or low land," the reservation
includes the wood and timber upon all of the granted premises which
lie further to the south than the meadow, and is not limited to that upon
the portion of the premises lying directly south of the meadow: Cronin
vs. Richardson, 8 Allen.
What may pass as Appurtenant.-A deed of a certain described lot
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of land, "together with all the dwelling-house and building, with the
appurtenances, situate thereon or thereto belonging, to have and to hold
the above-granted premises, with the privileges and appurtenances
thereto belonging," includes a small lot of land adjoining the granted
premises, which is habitually used with the dwelling-house, and is rea-
sonably necessary to be held in connection with it: Ammidown vs. Ball,
8 Allen.
DIVORCE.
Insanity of Libellant.-This court has authority to entertain a petition
filed by a third party, representing that a libellant for divorce is insane;
and, if such insanity is established, the court will appoint a guardian
ad litem to conduct the cause for the libellant: Denny and another vs.
Denny, 8 Allen.
Deserton.-If. a married woman leaves her husband with his consent,
and remains absent five years, this is not such a desertion as will entitle
him to a divorce: Lea vs. Lea, 8 Allen.
EASEMENT.
Grant.-After a partition by deed of certain real estate, a question
arose whether a right of way, or user of way which had for many years
existed to and from one portion of the estate over another portion, now
become severed, passed by the deed. The only words which could
include it were "with their and every of their rights, members, easements,
and appurtenances." Held, that it neither passed by the words nor by
implied grant: Worthington vs. Gimson, 2 Ell. & Ell. 618.
Extinguishment by .Aerger.-Where the title to two lots of ground
with an alley between them, running from one street to another, which
alley had been dedicated to the use of the lots bounding thereon by a
former owner, became vested in two persons as tenants in common, who
continued the use of the alley for many years, the right to use it passes
to a purchaser of an inner lot at a joint sale of the interests of the two
tenants in common by the administrator of one after his decease, and
the survivor and the purchaser of the two lots have no right to close it,
though the measurement in his deed extended to the centre of the alley
and embraced the whole of it: .MeCarty vs. Kitchenman, 11 Wright.
The easement being apparent and continuous, was not extinguished
by merger, in consequence of the unity of possession in the two joint
owners who had purchased subject to it, and had maintained its use; it
could not, therefore, be closed without the consent of all the owners of
lots bounding on it: Id.
EMINENT DOmAIN.
Title to Land taken for Public Use.-Title to land entered upon,
against the consent of the owner, by a water company, under their act
of incorporation, for the purpose of constructing a reservoir, does not
pass to the company until compensation is made or adequate security is
given therefore: Borough of Easton's Appeal, 11 Wright.
Hence, where the landowner refused the bond tendered by the com-
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pany, the sureties whereon afterward proved insufficient, and the com-
pany instituted proceedings to assess damages from the award of viewers,
in which the plaintiff appealed, no title to the land passed until by his
agreement, judgment was entered for the amount of the damages agreed
upon: and the judgment as for purchase-money was entitled to be first
paid out of the proceeds of the lot : Id.
A mortgage by the company of their property, franchises, and effects,
given after their entry upon the reservoir lot and before judgment for
damages, would bind their equitable interest therein subject to the pay-
ment of the judgment for purchase-money: Held, therefore, on distri-
bution of the proceeds of the sheriff's sale of the lot, that the balance
in bond after the judgment passed to the prior mortgage in preference
to one executed after the entry of the judgment and the vesting of the
legal title in the company: Id.
Whether a party to the distribution of money in court may be allowed
costs for witnesses, subpcenas, &c., is a matter for the discretion of the
court under the circumstances: as against an undisputed Hen no such
costs will be allowed, but as against a contesting claim the successful
party is entitled to costs out of the part of the fund contended for: Id.
FALSE PRETENCES.
Double Misstatement.-Indictment for obtaining a horse under false
pretences. The false statement laid was that prisoner represented him-
self the servant of W. Hardman. The evidence proved that the prose-
cutor understood him to mean W. Harding, whom prosecutor knew, andrisoner humored the mistake, and obtained the horse on approval.
Conviction quashed: the false pretence laid not being the one that ope-
rated on the prosecutor's mind: The Queen vs. Bulmer, C. C. R., 33
L. J. N. S. Mag. Cas. 151.
GUARDIAN.
Care in investment of Ward's 3one .- It is not reasonable care and
prudence in a guardian to invest his ward's money in the note of a single
person or a single firm, in active business, without security, unless ex-
traordinary circumstances are shown to justify such an investment; and
if a loss occurs in consequence thereof, he will be held responsible for
it: Clark and another vs. Garfield, 8 Allen.
GROUND RENT.
Arrears to be collected out of the Land.-Though the covenant in a
ground-rent deed is personal on the part of the covenantor, yet as to
arrears of rent accruing after his decease the landlord is restricted to
the realty out of which it issues, and is not entitled to payment out of
money in the hands of the executors: Williams' Appeal, 11 Wright.
But the personal representatives of the covenantor may be sued for
breaches of the covenant in the ground-rent deed occurring after his
death, the judgment to be restricted to the land bound by the covenant:
Id.
Quain's Appeal, 10 Harris 510, considered and affirmed. Taylor et
al. vs. Painter, 3 Phila. Rep. 365, affirmed: Id.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Curtesy in Wife's Land in Remainder.-A man has no interest as
tenant by the curtesy in land which his wife owns in remainder or rever-
sion, subject to a life estate; and he can convey no title thereto, which
will be valid against a subsequent levy thereon of an execution against
him and his wife: Shores vs. CaRley and others, 8 Allen.
Bill in Equity against separate Estate.-A bill in equity lies to en-
force payment out of the separate estate of a married woman, so far as
she has the right of disposal thereof, of a bond given by her for the
price of land conveyed to her to her sole and separate use, provided that
no effectual remedy exists at law. And the creditor is not confined to
collateral security held by him for the bond : Rogers vs. Ward, 8 Allen.
Such bill need not set out any specific estate or property belonging to
the defendant in her own right, but may allege generally that she is pos-
sessed of property to her sole and separate use, and subject to her dis-
posal, which is chargeable with the payment of the bond: Id.
-Legislative Divorces in other States-Estoppel.-The legislature of a
foreign state has no power to dissolve the marriage contract, when the
wife alone is resident within the state and subject to its jurisdiction, so
as to affect rights of property in another state where the husband is actu-
ally resident: Todd vs. Kerr, 42 Barb.
Where the husband is a citizen of one state and the wife resident
within another, can a state legislature destroy or impair the obligation
of the marriage contract by an act which takes the form of a law? Is
not such an act within the spirit, if not the very letter, of the constitu-
tional provision which forbids a state to pass any law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts? Qure : .d.
In such a case the wife is not estopped from denying the force and
efficacy of the legislative divorce: 
.d.
One who is not bound by an estoppel cannot claim the advantages of
it. And as the husband, under such circumstances, is not bound or
affected by the law of the foreign state, and therefore could not claim
that the act of the wife, in procuring the passage of the law, had the
effect of an estoppel, neither can his heir at law so claim: Id.
INSOLVENCY.
Discharge is bar to recoveryr of Damages for conversion of Goods.-
A dis9harge in insolvency is a bar to the recovery of damages for the
conversion of goods, though such damages are alleged by way of aggra-
vation in an action of tort for breaking and entering the plaintiff's close:
Bickford vs. Barnard and another, 8 Allen.
INSURANCE.
Time Policy with Extension Clause.-A time policy of insurance ou
vessel contained an extension clause, as follows: "If on a passage at
the end of the term, the risk to continue at pro rata premium until
arrival at port of destination." At the end of the term the vessel was
on a passage to Woosung, under a charter-party which provided that,
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CC on arrival at Woosung, the captain shall take his orders from the chief
of the French marine service at that port, who will indicate to him
within twenty-four hours if he is to discharge at Woosung, or go on to
ahusan, and that after the arrival of the ship at Woosung, the marine
might keep her as long as it might wish, and send her to such safe and
accessible port as it might judge desirable." Held, that if no orders to
go to another port were received within twenty-four hours after notice
to the chief of the French marine service at Woosung of her arrival
there, that should be regarded as her port of destination, within the
meaning of the extension clause: Wales and others vs. The China A1u-
tual Ins. Co., 8 Allen.
Insurable Interest-Statements in Application.-The conditions an-
nexed to a policy of insurance, and forming a part thereof, required that
applications for insurance should specify the nature of the applicant's
title, if less than a fee simple; and that any misstatement or concealment
should render the insurance void. B., in an application for insurance,
represented that he owned the property by virtue of an article of agree-
ment with 0. The agreement, as proved, was for the sale of a village
lot by 0.1 to B., without any exception or reservation, for a specified sum
to be paid by B. The dwelling-house was on the lot, at the date of the
agreement, and when the insurance was applied for. There was no
proof that B. represented, in his application, that he owned the dwell-
ing-house as a chattel not affixed to the soil. Held, that the contract of
insurance related solely to the interest which B. had in the building, as
the vendee in possession of the soil on which it stood; and that the
judge, on the trial, properly overruled B.'s offer to prove that the build-
ing was a chattel not affixed to the freehold, and that, at the time of the
insurance, he was the owner of it, and continued to be the owner up to
the time of the fire: Birmingham vs. The Empire Insurance Company,
42 Barb.
Held, also, that the statement in the application, respecting the nature
of B.'s title, was a warranty; and it being untrue, the policy did not take
effect. That the insurers did not insure the building as a chattel : id.
That the agreement of the parties precluded all inquiry as to whether
B. had any other insurable interest than that warranted; or as to whe-
ther the thing warranted was material to the risk : Id.
Where a party states, in his application for insurance, that he is the
owner of the property, by virtue of an article of agreement with an-
other, he cannot be allowed to show, in an action on the policy, that at
the time of making the application he told the agent of the insurer that
he owned the building, having purchased it before he took the contract
for the land: it being an offer to contradict the written application by
parol : Id:
Where articles of agreement for the sale and purchase of land pro-
vide that in case the purchaser shall be in default in making his pay-
ments, the vendor shall have the right to declare the contract void, and
may take possession of the premises; and the purchaser being in de-
fault, the vendor notified him to surrender the possession, and he com-
plied with the demand and removed from the premises; Held, that these
proceedings terminated B.'s insurable interest i, the building, under the
contract, and the contract became void: Id.
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JUDGMENT.
Assignment after Payment-Power of Altorney ove.-A bail for a
stay of execution in a judgment for arrears of ground-rent, who, after
the expiration of the stay and judgment upon his recognisance of bail,
pays the debt, interest, and costs, and obtains an assignment of the ori-
ginal judgment from the plaintiff's attorney, is not thereby entitled to
priority over a judgment afterwards obtained by the plaintiff for arrears
of rent subsequently accrued: De Cou's Appeal, Fassitt et al. vs. Mid-
dieton, 11 Wright.
Whether an attorney at law has power after obtaining judgment to
assign it, not decided: but he has no power after judgment to make
such an assignment of it to one who pays it because he must do so, as
will continue the judgment to the prejudice of his client's rights in
other respects 
: .d.
Such assignment alone will not interfere with the claim of the ground-
rent owner to the proceeds of sheriff's sale of the real estate bound, for
his right takes effect by relation back to the date of the deed by which
the rent was reserved: to give the judgment assigned priority, there
must be an estoppel, by agreement to guarantee it, or some stipulation to
postpone; for though the assignment imports warranty of title, it is not
a guaranty of collection or of the lien as primary, but only of a sound
debt unimpaired by secret defences, payment, or other matter which
would render it invalid: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Of .Personaltly, for Sums to become Due.-A mortgage of personal
property given to secure such sums as may thereafter become due to the
mortgagee is not a valid security, as against a judgment-creditor of the
mortgagor, for claims accruing after the property was attached in his
suit, and the mortgagee summoned as trustee: Barnard vs. Moore and
another, 8 Allen.
Assignor and Assignee of, Accounts between-Over-Paynents.-If the
owner of a mortgage assigns the same, and subsequently acquires the
title to the mortgaged premises, he takes them subject to the charge
created by the mortgage. In other words, he occupies the place of the
mortgagor, and the account between him and the assignee should be
stated as between mortgagor and mortgagee: Thompson vs. Otis, 42
Barb.
Over-payments made by him under a mutual mistake, or from errone-
ous computations, though in a certain sense voluntary, are not so in the
sense which precludes their being recovered back: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Scienter-Corporation.-In an action of tort for negligently keeping
a dog which was given to bite, a corporation may be liable as well as an
individual, but the scienter must be proved with, regard to somie person
who had control of the yard where the dog was kept, or of the dog
itself, and scienter in a mere servant was held not sufficient to maintain
the action: Stiles vs. Cardiff_ Navigation Co., Q. B., 83 L. J. N. S. 310.
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Railroad Comany.-Crossing a railroad track without looking to see
if a train is coming is not conclusive proof of a want of care ; and if it
appears that there is a double track, and a person has just bought a
ticket at a station for a train which is to pass upon the further track,
and the station agent says to him, "The train is coming; we will cross
over," and he attempts to follow the agent, upon the premises of the
railroad company, to take his place in the train, which meanwhile has
arrived, and, in crossing over the nearer track for that purpose, is struck
by a train coming from the other direction, and partially behind him,
which he did not look for or see until too late to save himself, it is pro-
per to submit it as a question of fact for the jury to determine whether
he was careless. And while so going from the ticket office to take his
seat in the cars he is to be considered as a passenger, and is entitled to
the rights of a passenger; and it is the duty of the railroad company to
use the utmost care and diligence in providing for him a safe and con-
venient way and manner of access to the train, and in preventing the
interposition of any obstacle which would unreasonably impede him or
expose him to harm while proceeding to take his seat in the cars, in
order to prevent those injuries which human care and foresight can
guard against: Warren vs. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 8 Allen.
Fellow-Servant.-Plaintiff was employed by builders in erecting a
scaffolding, and met with an injury which arose from a deficient supply.
of boards, through the negligence of the foreman of the works; the
defendants, the builders, not knowing of the negligence, and the fore-
man being a competent person. Held, the defendants were exempt from
liability under the rule that the plaintiff and the foreman were fellow-
servants in a common employment. The case would have been different
if the foreman was the general agent of the defendants and represented
them. BYLEs, J., agreed in the law, but considered that the foreman
was acting-master, and represented the defendants: Gallagher vs. Piper.
16 0. B. N. S. 669.
Public Bodies.-Persons intrusted with the performance of a public
duty, discharging it gratuitously, and themselves taking no personal part
in its performance, and having no funds at their disposal, out of which
compensation for injury, arising from the negligent acts of the persons
employed by them, can be made, are exempted from liability in respect
to such negligence. The drainage commissioners of the Middle Level
Fens, held entitled to this exemption in an action for damages in not
properly maintaining a sluice which they were bound to maintain. Per
COCKBURN, 0. J., and MELLOR, J. BLACKBURN, J., dissentiente:
Cox vs. Wise, Q. B., 33 L. J. N. S. 281.
Injury to Servant.-A railroad company may be held liable for an
injury to one of its servants, which is caused by a want of repair in the
road-bed of the railroad: Snow vs. .ousatonic R.R. Co., 8 Allen.
If it is the duty of a servant of a railroad company to uncouple the
cars of a train, and this cannot easily be done while the train is still,
and he, in endeavoring to uncouple them while the train is in motion,
steps between the cars and meets with an injury which is caused by a
want of repair of the road-bed of the railroad, the court cannot rule as
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
matter of law that he was careless, but should submit the question to be
determined by the jury; although he continued in the employment of
the company after he knew of the defect: Id.
" PARTITION.
Bill in Equity to correct after Thirteen ear&.-A bill in equity does
not lie to correct an error in the report of commissioners appointed to
make partition of the real estate of a deceased person, thirteen years
after its acceptance and confirmation by the probate court, especially if
such bill does not allege that the defendants, who claim title to the pre-
mises in dispute as purchasers, knew of the error at the time when they
acquired their title: Hathaway and another vs. Thayer and others, 8
Allen.
PARTNERSHIP.
One Partner drawing more than his Share-Action by the Partners.-
A member of a firm which consists of more than two persons is liable to
his partners jointly for a sum which, upon settlement, he is found to
have withdrawn from the joint funds in excess of his share; and one of
them cannot maintain an action therefor in his own name alone, although
he has an assignment of all the right and interest of his associates in
the assets of the firm: Wiggin vs. (umings, 8 Allen.
iability to accept.-Two distinct mercantile houses, V. & Co., at
Buenos Ayres, and R. & Co., at London, agree by letter to enter into
exchange transactions on joint profit and loss, by V. & Co. drawing on
R. & Co. and selling the bills in usual course. It was held, that although
this amounted to a partnership quoad such transactions, yet that there
was no authority, either actual or implied, in V. & Co., by their drawing,
to bind R. & Co. as drawers or to accept; nor any liability of R. & Co.
for money had and received on the sale of bills which R. & Co. refused
to accept: Nicholson vs. Ricketts, 2 Ell. & EU1. 497.
PATENT.
Chemical Discoveries.-Wide distinctions drawn between inventions
in mechanics and inventions in chemistry. In the latter a patent was
held valid, although the material produced thereby was previously
known, but could only be produced in such small quantities as to be
rather a matter of curiosity than of use. Whereas, by means of the pro-
ceas adopted by the invention, the material was produced in quantities
sufficient to supply the market for useful and economical purposes:
Young vs. Fernie, V. C. STEWART, 10 Jur. N. S. 926.
QUO WARRANTO.
Private Office.--Quo warranto will not issue except concerning an
office of a public nature, and was refused concerning an oflice of a
society, incorporated for a private eleemosynary purpose: Ex parle
Keble $vth, Q. B., 2 New Rep. 321.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
REPLEVIN.
,Statement of Value of Goods-Defene to Action.-It is not neces-
sary, in a writ of replevin, which is directed to a deputy sheriff, to allege
the value of the goods to be replevied: Fomeroy vs. Trimper 8 Allen.
A defendant in replevin, who has prevented the officer from delivering
the replevied property to the plaintiff by attaching it upon a writ in his
own favor, cannot object to the prosecution of the replevin on the ground
of such non-delivery: Id.
It is no ground for dismissing a writ of replevin, that an animal de-
scribed in the writ as a heifer is described in the certificate of appraise-
ment as a cow; or that the plaintiff has caused the officer, to whom the
writ was committed, to bring an action against the defendant and another
officer for taking the replevied property out of his hands, before its de-
livery to the plaintiff; or that the plaintiff. as executor, has commenced
an action against the defendant and his officer for the conversion of the
replevied property, if it does not appear that the conversion relied upon
was the same act for which the replevin was brought: Id.
SHERIFF.
Suit upon Official Bond.-The recovery of a judgment against a
sheriff, for an escape, will establish the liability of the sheriff, so as to
authorize an application under the Revised Statutes (2 R. S. 476, §§ 1,
2, 3), by the party injured, for leave to prosecute the official bond of
the sheriff; provided there has been no stay of proceedings ordered
upon such judgment. But, if the proceedings have been stayed, by
order of the court, no such application can be made during the continu-
ance of the stay: Matter of Chamberlain et al., 42 Barb.
STREAM.
Rights of Riparian Owners.-The owner of land through which a
stream flows, may increase the volume of water therein by draining into
it, without liability for damages to a lower owner, but he cannot by any
artificial channel drain off water standing upon his own land upon that
of another: Miller vs. Laubach, 11 Wright.
In an action for damages caused by turning water from defendant's
land upon that of the plaintiff, the charge of the court to the jury, that
if they found that the defendant did collect water from his own land,
and turned it in a body upon that of the plaintiff, through an artificial
channel, to his injury, the latter was entitled to recover the damages he
had sustained, was not error: Id.
SURETY.
Concealment-Fraud.-Plaintiff being dissatisfied with his commis-
sion agent, who was largely indebted to hi on account of sales, threat-
ened. to dismiss him unless he procured a surety. Defendant became a
surety, but was not informed that the agent was then in arrear. Eeld,
this concealment was evidence of fraud for the jury to find a verdict for
defendant: Lee vs. Jones, C. P., 2 New R. 26.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TAXATION.
Remedies for Collection of Assessments-Power of Legislature- Con-
stitutional Law.-The assessment authorized by the act of the legisla-
ture of April 19, 1859, to provide for closing the entrance of the tun-
nel of the Long Island Railroad Company, in the city of Brooklyn,
being a tax imposed fbr a local improvement, and the power exercised
by the legislature in that Act and in the Act of larch 23d, 1860, modi-
fying the same, by providing for the collection of such tax by a sale of
the property of owners not benefited by the improvement, being a legi-
timate exercise of the taxing power, the legislature also had the power
to give a remedy by action, in the name of the collector appointed under
the Act of 1859, against an owner of property benefited, for the reco-
very of an assessment made upon his property: Litchfield, Collector, &c.,
vs. PecComber, 42 Barb.
If a tax is just and legal in its inception, there is no limitation upon
the power of the legislature to provide for its collection ; and such power
is to be exercised at the discretion of the legislature: -1d.
The tax laws proceed upon the principle that a tax assessed by autho-
rity of law, for a general or local purpose, creates a duty and an obliga-
tion by the tax-payer to make the payment. This obligation results
from the nature of the relation between the government and the con-
stituent: Id.
There is no such thing, under our system, as a tax upon lands irre-
spective of the owner, except in the single case of the lands of non-resi-
dent owners. The tax is assessed upon the person, in respect to the
lands, as it certainly is assessed upon the person in respect to the per-
sonal property taxed: Id.
The power to tax being without limitation, it results by logical impli-
cation, that the legislature may resort to all or any of the usual remedies,
for the collection of an assessment: Id.
The Act of April 19th, 1859, created the assessment district, therein
mentioned, upon the theory that it was to be benefited by the improve-
ment; and the collector being an officer appointed at the same time,
there was no constitutional impediment in the way of conferring the
power of appointing the collector upon the Long Island Railroad Com-
pany, who were exclusively interested in, and entitled to, the tax autho-
rized to be collected : ld.
TIME.
When of the Essence of a Contract-Specific Performance.-If a
thing sold is of greater or less value according to the effluxion of time,
it is manifest that time is of the essence of the contract, and a stipula-
tion as to time must be literally complied w th, in equity as well as at
law: Gale vs. Archer, 42 Barb.
Where a contract for the sale and purchase of land contemplates that
the vendor shall vacate his residence upon the premises, on the day
named for the payment of the purchase-money, and seek a home else-
where for himself and family, time must be regarded as of primary con-
sequence to him, and as of the essence of the contract: Id.
So, also, where the agreement provides for the sale and transfer of i
farm with growing crops thereon, in the midst of the growing season,
with horses, cattle, &c., requiring personal attention: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Bills for the specific performance of contracts are applications to the
equitable jurisdiction of the court. The relief sought is not a matter
of right: Id.
The court will exercise a sound and reasonable discretion, and will
never grant the relief thus sought unless it is entirely equitable and
right, and will work no injustice to the adverse party: Id.
TRUST.
Operative Trust-Powers of Cestui que Trust.-A devise to a trustee
of real and personal estate to hold in trust for and to collect and receive
the rents, issues, and interests, and pay over the same to son of the tes-
tatrix during his natural life without being subject to his debts and lia-
bilities, is an active operative trust, and the whole estate is vested in the
trustee: Shankland's Appeal, 11 Wright.
Hence the cestui que trust cannot dispose of his interest in the estate
devised in trust for him, and a court of equity will not decree specific
execution of the agreement of sale: Id.
WARRANTY.
Illeqal Consideration.-No action lies on a warranty given upon the
sale of a horse, the price of which was paid in spirituous liquors which
the purchaser could not legally sell: Howard vs. Blarnis, 8 Allen.
WAY.
Private Way opening on Public Street.-If a private way is opened,
leading from a public street, and prepared for use in the same manner
as a public street, and with nothing to show that it is not such, the pub-
lic may lawfully travel over it, although it is closed at one end; and in
so doing they are bound only to the same degree of care, in respect to
others who are also lawfully using it, as in travelling over public streets:
Danforth vs. Durell, 8 Allen.
WILL.
Construction-Same Words same Meaning.--Unless there be some
very strong indication to the contrary on the face of a will, the same
words must be held to mean the same thing in every part of the will in
which they are used-a very strong case of the rule: larvey vs. Bar-
vey, 32 Beav. 441.
Execution.-Part of a codicil, physically underneath or following the
signature, pronounced for, the sense and manner in which it was written
satisfying the court that it formed part of the codicil, antecedent to the
signature: In the Goods of Kimpton, Probate Court, 33 L. J. N. S. 158.
Repugnancy.-Where a testator gives an absolute interest, and then
adds that if the donee does not dispose of it by will, the fund shall go
to other persons; this condition is void for repugnancy: Weale vs. Oli-
ver, 32 Beav. 421.
